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ABSTRACT
PAYING FOR YOUR CRIME: THE PAY-TO-STAY JAIL PROGRAM IN
CALIFORNIA
by Carla S. Schultz
Many California cities have recently implemented pay-to-stay jail programs at the
local level. Pay-to-stay programs provide a safe and private incarceration experience for
those who can afford the nightly fee. This study provides a theoretical analysis of the
pay-to-stay jail program in relation to mass incarceration and the ever-expanding prison
economy. It examines pay-to-stay programs as a new method of stratified punishment,
reproducing race and class oppression within the U.S. penal regime. A case study of the
Fremont pay-to-stay program offers insight into the implementation, operation, and
application process for inmates seeking segregation from general county jail populations.
This study concludes that pay-to-stay creates a two-tiered jail system—separating the
deserving from the undeserving—and promotes disproportionate treatment within the
criminal justice system.
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Introduction
“Pay-to-stay” jail programs, a growing phenomenon within the correctional
system, charge inmates a nightly fee for a stay in a safe jail. Offered throughout
California, pay-to-stay jails provide an alternative and exclusive incarceration experience,
allowing eligible inmates to escape violent, overcrowded, and unsafe detention conditions
in county jail facilities. In 2012, the Fremont Police Department opened California Bay
Area’s first pay-to-stay jail program. In Fremont’s pay-to-stay jail, visitors pay $155 per
night to stay in a “clean and efficiently operated” (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to
Stay”) facility with access to community areas, showers, phones, and a private cell. The
city police departments of Fremont, Beverly Hills, Huntington Beach, Arcadia, Fullerton,
and Redondo Beach, to name a few, are currently interviewing and accepting inmates
into their exclusive pay to stay jail programs. Inmates who meet the eligibility
requirements set forth by the city’s police department are financially responsible for their
own incarceration, paying anywhere from $100 (e.g., City of Arcadia, City of Fullerton
Police) to $198 per night (e.g., City of Redondo Beach). The emergence of pay-to-stay
programs in California and other states ignites many questions and concerns about
equality in the ever-expanding United States carceral system.
Over the last 40 years, the United States’ penal landscape and correctional
economy has shifted drastically. Beginning in the 1970s, draconian policies, aggressive
police tactics, and discriminatory “wars” fueled a massive incarceration binge. “Today,”
writes Simon (2014), “the number of people imprisoned in America remains at or near
historic highs (nearly four times the average incarceration rate for the first three quarters
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of the twentieth century)” (p.1). Approximately 2.4 million people are confined in the
United States at any given moment, with nearly 12 million people cycling through local
jails per year (Wagner & Sakala, 2014). Chronic overcrowding and lack of adequate
inmate healthcare have produced an incarceration system not based on rehabilitation, but
incapacitation and human warehousing (Simon, 2014). California’s pay-to-stay programs
offer an escape from the violent, overcrowded, and unsafe conditions of county jails—
with a price.
Chapter I explores the road to mass incarceration in the United States—detailing
the punitive shift and the emerging prison crisis. Mass incarceration is described as the
most recent system of oppression stemming from a history of racist and despotic
institutions in the United States. It is examined through the lenses of critical
criminologists Wacquant (2001), Davis (2003), and Alexander (2010), to name a few.
Chapter I also describes how minorities, the poor, and low-level offenders have been
disproportionately affected by the policies of mass incarceration. A thorough
understanding of mass incarceration allows for a deeper, more meaningful discussion
about what it means to introduce pay-to-stay programs in today’s justice system. Chapter
II develops a history of the United States prison economy. Pay-to-stay programs are
evaluated as a successor in a long line of inmate exploitation—from slavery, to convict
leasing, and private prisons. Charging inmates for the costs of incarceration is a
neoliberal response to the economic recession and prison overcrowding crisis. Chapter II
also identifies other ways in which the financial burden has been shifted away from the
state and on to the inmate. In Chapter III, a detailed history of the pay-to-stay program is
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provided along with a case study of the Fremont pay-to-stay jail program. The case study
analyzes the Fremont pay-to-stay program’s implementation, operation, and application
process. The study concludes with an analysis and future recommendations in Chapter
IV.
This study attempts to answer the following research questions: (1) Why are payto-stay programs being implemented? (2) What are the relationships between pay-to-stay
programs and the changing prison economy? (3) How has pay-to-stay gained public
acceptance? (4) Historically, how have inmates paid for their incarceration? (5) Who is
eligible for pay-to-stay? (6) How is pay-to-stay implemented? The overall goal of this
study is to evaluate California’s pay-to-stay jail program and its implications for the
justice system and society as a whole.
Chapter I. Mass Incarceration & Theoretical Framework
Pay-to-stay programs are only one part of the broad and wide-ranging punishment
apparatus in the United States. Therefore, a solid understanding of the evolution of mass
incarceration helps one situate pay-to-stay programs within the U.S. penal system. This
chapter provides a history of mass incarceration and a road map for how the criminal
justice system has developed—resulting in today’s prison crisis.
For the past four decades, the U.S. has been systematically incarcerating its
citizens at an alarming rate (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The U.S. state and federal prison population from 1925-2012.
Source: The Sentencing Project (2015)

Currently, 1 in 31 adults is under the control of the U.S. correctional system (Clear &
Frost, 2014, p. 63), which has rapidly become the largest in the world. In the second half
of the 20th century, the United States witnessed great strides toward the affirmation of
civil and human rights, but these progressive developments have been paralleled—in
ways that some of the literature has considered non-coincidental (see Flamm 2007; see
also Murakawa, 2014) — by an unprecedented expansion of the carceral system, with
regards to both prison building and the subsequent stockpiling of human bodies. Scholars
in the field of punishment and society have referred to this unprecedented expansion of
the penal system as ‘mass incarceration’ (Wacquant, 2001; Davis, 2003; Simon, 2014).
First described by Garland in 2001, mass incarceration refers to “an abnormally high rate
of imprisonment which is concentrated, and thus affects, a particular demographic
population” (Martensen, 2012, p. 211). Mass incarceration describes a penal era,
beginning in the 1970s, characterized by increasingly punitive penal policies, a massive
process of prison expansion, and growing levels of social stratification (Wacquant, 2009).
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This following chapter explores the path to mass incarceration in the United States,
providing a broad overview of how it was implemented and against whom. This
reconstruction is grounded in a theoretical framework based on conflict theory, critical
criminology, and critical race theory.
Theoretical Framework: A Critical Lens
Critical criminologists argue that systems of incarceration are inherently
oppressive. In his recent works, Wacquant (2001) famously identifies “four peculiar
institutions” that have contributed to racialized hierarchies of social inequality over the
past two centuries in the United States. These institutions include slavery, Jim Crow, the
urban ghetto, and the hyperghetto/prison. The most recent among these “race-making”
institutions—what Wacquant (2001) defines as a “deadly symbiosis” between the postindustrial ghetto and the contemporary warehousing prison—acts as a pipeline between
strictly policed urban neighborhoods and a hypertrophic criminal justice system. This
pipeline has fueled mass incarceration. Wacquant (2001) claims that previous systems of
oppression failed when they no longer met the needs of the economy nor the prevailing
cultural and legal sensibilities of the time, and were therefore replaced with new systems,
better aligned with the requirements of contemporary socioeconomic paradigms.
Along similar lines, in her bestseller The New Jim Crow (2010), Michelle
Alexander traces a history of institutional racial oppression from slavery, to postReconstruction Black Codes, and Jim Crow laws. Alexander (2010) identifies mass
incarceration as the current mode of institutional racial subjugation stemming from the
aforementioned line of predecessors. According to Alexander, systems of racial
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oppression have evolved over time to adhere to evolving legislation, constitutional
standards, and dominant societal norms (Alexander, 2010). She argues that mass
incarceration reproduces a caste system based on racial hierarchy, white supremacy, and
the marginalization of poor African Americans. Blanketed in race-neutral and classneutral language, mass incarceration exists through a false cloak of “colorblindness” (see
also Bonilla-Silva 2013; Omi & Winant, 2014). The penal system is a racialized
institution of violence and oppression, continuing to thrive under the banner of ‘justice
for all.’
Although the succession of racially oppressive institutions has been brought to the
forefront of critical criminology, the reproduction of structures of class oppression in a
late-capitalist society like the United States is not as prominently discussed in the
literature. In this work, I argue that it is equally imperative to acknowledge that this
historical lineage of oppressive institutions is designed to discipline individuals based on
race and class. Therefore, this study draws from the epistemological framework of
critical criminology—and more specifically, from the structural perspective known as the
“political economy of punishment” (see De Giorgi 2012)—to analyze the foundation and
consequences of pay-to-stay jail programs.
According to Hallett (2006), “critical criminology is rooted in the ‘conflict’
perspective of sociology, which views social relations in terms of groups vying for social
power. Instead of working together in a consensual fashion for the common good, groups
with unequal power and competing interests constantly battle for control over access to
resources, prestige, and political entrée” (p. 22). Classical social theorists such as Karl
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Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Georg Simmel were the pioneers of conflict theory in the
mid-1800s. They insisted that social disorder was the product of a capitalist economy,
and was caused by the economic exploitation of one social class by another. Later on,
Marxist criminologist Willem Bonger applied conflict theory specifically to
criminological theory to develop what he defined as a “socialist theory of crime.” Bonger
claimed that crime resulted from the criminogenic contradictions of capitalism.
Capitalism created a divide between the rulers and the ruled, and pitted people against
one another in economic struggle. He, too, saw crime as a product of unequal distribution
of wealth and power produced by the acquisitive logic of the capitalist economy.
Conflict theory argues that group interests regarding lawmaking and penal
function are not equally represented. Rather, more powerful groups have the authority to
define crime and determine both how to enforce the law, and against what populations.
The conflict perspective posits that “inequalities in social power are ultimately a real
source of what gets defined as ‘crime’” (Hallett, 2006, p. 23), thus creating an unequal
penal system based on the values of the dominant social group.
Critical criminology is influenced by conflict theory, as it too recognizes
discrepancies in the law as experienced by different social groups. Early critical
criminologists examined these discrepancies in group power and in the application of the
law from an economic perspective. Marxist theories focused on class struggle, economic
barriers, and power imbalances between groups of different socio-economic statuses. A
rich vs. poor dynamic was used to explain differences in crime and punishment,
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essentially theorizing that laws were written and enforced by the upper class against the
lower classes.
In the past few decades, critical criminology has expanded its focus to incorporate
analyses of other group inequalities, such as race and gender. As Hallett (2006) explains,
“critical criminology has thus evolved from its early focus on economics as the primary
source of group inequality to now include examination of the class, racial, patriarchal,
and colonialistic social relations that enabled the economic exploitation described by
earlier critical criminologists” (p. 24). Under this perspective, the economic exploitation
of certain groups is rooted in the preexisting oppressive institutions of racism and gender
inequality; thus, the institutions of race, class, and gender are intertwined.
Critical race theory further enriches the theoretical toolkit of critical criminology,
as it associates identity markers (such as race, class, and gender status) with oppression,
social injustice, and political power. Thus, critical race theorists argue that specific
identity markers such as “whiteness,” “masculinity,” “darkness,” and “femininity” are
historically associated with varying degrees of access to wealth and power—including
the power to punish. In the realm of punishment, “darkness” has become increasingly
associated with poverty, crime, and incarceration. Rather than seeing social status as a
byproduct of historically oppressive institutions, critical race theorists understand social
identity markers as the actual “mechanisms of oppression” (Hallett, 2006, p. 28).
Socioeconomic markers related to race and class also correlate with the severity
of punishment, and, more specifically, with chances (and duration) of imprisonment.
Crimes of the upper class—such as “white collar crimes”—are typically not handled by
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the justice system with the same strictness as crimes of the lower class. Social status and
privilege can indirectly determine the extent of punishment. Normally, those who can
afford fines, restitution, bail, the costs of house arrest, and other fees are able to escape
incarceration. In this respect, the pay-to-stay program introduces yet another method in
which the justice system can provide differential treatment for the social elite.
The development of pay-to-stay options as an alternative for privileged
populations is especially concerning within the context of today’s extensive prison
regime. The pay-to-stay program takes an already marginalized population of offenders,
and separates them further based on socioeconomic status and eligibility requirements. It
labels some offenders as “less guilty” and affords them a safe, less humiliating
incarceration experience—an experience free of many “collateral effects” of
incarceration in chronically overcrowded penal institutions, such as prison violence,
deprivation of basic needs and lack of health care. Pay-to-stay programs offer an escape
from devastating prison conditions and from institutionalized disregard for human rights.
Accepting only those who can afford it, pay-to-stay programs anchor the United States’
oppressive carceral system in the consumerist logic of contemporary neoliberal society.
Part 1. Hidden Agendas: A Road Map to Mass Incarceration
Prior to the 1970s, incarceration rates in the United States remained surprisingly
stable, rarely exceeding averages of 200,000 prisoners per year, with incarceration rates
comparable to those observed in other Western democracies. Beginning in 1972 and
continuing well in to the 21st century, the prison population increased relentlessly each
year. It is nearly impossible to get an accurate count of incarcerated persons, as the
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population fluctuates daily with new arrests and releases. However, it has been estimated
that over two million people are incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails at any given time
(Clear & Frost, 2014).
The United States currently confines people in its “1,719 state prisons, 102 federal
prisons, 2,259 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,283 local jails, and 79 Indian Country
jails” (Wagner & Sakala, 2014). Individuals are also detained in military prisons, civil
commitment centers, immigration detention facilities, and prisons in other U.S. territories
(Wagner & Sakala, 2014). In 2014, a comprehensive analysis of the United States
incarcerated population concluded that 2.3 million people were imprisoned in state
prisons, federal prisons, and local jails. That is slightly more than the total number of
active and reserve U.S. military personnel—about 2.26 million as of 2010 (Hurt, Ryan, &
Straley, 2011). It is also slightly more than the number of people employed by Wal-Mart
worldwide—2.2 million associates as of 2014. Currently, the United States has the
highest rate of incarceration in world history—over 700 people per 100,000 (Steiker &
Steiker, 2014).
What could have caused incarceration rates to grow so exponentially, that the
United States would come to represent 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the
world’s incarcerated population? “Tough on crime” politicians and other advocates of
prison expansion have argued that a massive growth in crime, especially violent crime,
caused the growth in the prison population (Mauer, 2006). Although this line of thinking
may seem logical, it is unfounded.
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If incarceration rates were truly a reflection of crime rates, the two would have
mirroring trends. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing on into the 1970s, crime was
rising in the United States (Alexander, 2010; Mauer, 2006). This increase, however, was
not uniform across all categories, locations, or social groups. Although there is much
controversy over the accuracy of crime data during this period, most sociologists and
criminologists agree that violent crimes, including homicide, increased quite significantly
during this time. This rise in violent crime, however, has been largely attributed to related
changes in demographics, such as the males from the ‘baby boom’ population entering
their peak crime years—ages 15 to 24 (Alexander, 2010; Mauer). This short-lived rise in
crime can be described merely as a data point, rather than a trend.
According to most accounts, crime rates peaked in the United States in 1981
(Haney Lopez, 2010; Mauer, 2006). Shortly after, crime rates stabilized and eventually
began to decrease over the next 20 years (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Incarceration rates per 100,000 compared to crime rates per 100,000 from 1970-2002
Source: The Sentencing Project (King, Mauer, & Young, 2005)
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The specific categories of violent crime and street crime followed a similar trend. To
illustrate, an average of 40 million Americans were victims of crime in the years 1973
and 1982, followed by 35 million in 1992, and 25 million in 2000 (Wacquant, 2009, p.
11). Although street crime did rise in the 1960s and 1970s, it eventually stabilized in the
1980s, and continued to decline for the next two decades. Despite the limited reliability
of crime statistics, available data suggest a steady decrease in street crime since the early
1990s—at the same time as incarceration rates were skyrocketing. According to federal
crime data, the homicide and non-negligent manslaughter rate remained steady from 1975
to 1995—oscillating from 8 to 10 persons per 100,000—and then decreased to 5 persons
per 100,000 in 2000 (Wacquant, 2009). Still, in an era of decreasing crime rates, the 1994
Uniform Crime Report announced: “Every American now has a realistic chance of
murder victimization in view of the random nature that crime has assumed” (as cited in
Wacquant, 2009, p. 13). Put forth by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this sentiment
reaffirmed that every American should be afraid of crime. However, crime statistics
simply do not justify this notion.
Incarceration rates have grown fivefold since the mid-1970s. Criminologists tend
to agree that crime rates offer little to no explanation for this rate of growth (Tonry, 2004;
Wacquant, 2009; Mauer, 2006; Beckett, 1997). Still, to quote Hammer (2001), “we [are]
encouraged by media, politicians, and popular culture to believe that our society builds
prisons as a response to crime” (p. 244). The current prison regime utilizes the crime
“problem” to rally public consensus around penal punitiveness, allowing the state to
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reproduce racial and class inequality under the apparently neutral ideology of ‘free
choice’ and ‘retribution’ (Wacquant, 2009).
It is essential to understand how the incarcerated population reached such
alarming, record-breaking highs. Mass incarceration cannot be explained as a result of
rising crime rates. Many scholars have questioned the seemingly invisible forces that
created such a punitive regime. In order to build a comprehensive understanding of how
mass incarceration came to existence, a variety of historical, social, and political forces
must be weaved into the analysis. As Elliot Currie concisely states, “short of major wars,
mass incarceration has been the most thoroughly implemented government social
program of our time” (as quoted by Davis, 2003, p. 11). Rather than seeing mass
incarceration as the result of a crime problem, we must address it as a social problem
deeply rooted within the history of the United States.
Shortly before the massive expansion of its penal apparatus, the United States was
experiencing great social turmoil. Groups of women, minorities, migrant workers, and
college students were fighting for social, civil, and political change. By the 1960s, the
Civil Rights Movement had become the largest social movement of its time, uniting
citizens across different racial and economic backgrounds. It also brought riots, protest,
and defiance to the forefront of public concern. In 1964, the members of the Civil Rights
Movement celebrated the passing of the Civil Rights Acts. Within months, Barry
Goldwater publicly announced his opposition to the Civil Rights Acts and used his
opposition as a platform for presidential candidacy (Clear & Frost, 2014). Goldwater
associated the riots of the Civil Rights Movement with public fear of crime, more
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specifically, the public fear of black crime. He warned the masses: “crime grows faster
than population, while those who break the law are accorded more consideration than
those who try to enforce the law […] Our wives, all women, feel unsafe on our streets”
(Haney Lopez, 2010, p. 1032-1033). Although Goldwater wasn’t voted in as President,
his “get tough” outlook on crime resurfaced only a few years later.
Lyndon B. Johnson triumphed over Goldwater in the race to the White House.
Immediately, Johnson began addressing the crime issue and developed an anticrime
agenda. In 1967, President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice released its renowned report The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society. The Commission’s report began with a discussion of rising crime and public
fear, stating that the United States was becoming increasingly unsafe. “Some,” the report
claimed, “have become suspicious of those they conceive to be responsible for crime:
adolescents or Negroes or drug addicts or college students or demonstrators; policemen
who fail to solve crimes; judges who pass lenient sentences or write decisions restricting
the activities of the police; parole boards that release prisoners who resume their criminal
activities” (Commission, 1986, p. 55). Teens, minorities, drug offenders, peaceful
protesters, and the poor were identified as dangerous and as the cause of the rising crime
problem. The report later identified the underlying problems of crime as beyond the
control of the criminal justice system, placing the blame on a disobedient society: “the
unruliness of young people, widespread drug addiction, the existence of much poverty in
a wealthy society, the pursuit of the dollar by any available means are the phenomena the
police, the courts, and the correctional apparatus, which must deal with crimes and
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criminals one by one, cannot confront directly” (Commission, 1986, p. 56). The
Commission, then, meticulously described the crime problem as a “disease” plaguing the
United States and developed a plan of action. According to Clear and Frost (2014), this
plan was “a road map for [the] War on Crime” (p. 41).
In 1968, Nixon won the presidential election. His platform was profoundly aimed
toward one issue: law and order. In a short span of time, Nixon delivered seventeen
speeches on the “pressing” issue of law and order (Alexander, 2010), with advertisements
linking civil disruption in the streets to street crime. He proposed a seemingly colorblind
War on Crime, which allowed him to gain voter approval in the South while still
addressing the national fear of crime (Clear & Frost, 2014). The War on Crime continued
for the next 40 years, leaving behind a path of social destruction. The law and order
rhetoric of the 1960s eventually translated to anticrime legislation that would influence
federal and state crime control tactics for decades. By 1990, federal spending on
corrections had increased fourfold (Haney Lopez, 2010). The direct expenditures on
corrections increased from roughly $9 billion to $68 billion between the years of 1982 to
2006 (Clear & Frost, 2014, p. 20). The United States’ War on Crime has lasted longer
than any of its overseas military campaigns (Clear & Frost, 2014), resulting in mass
incarceration and the hyperinflation of the correctional budget. In the wake of the War on
Crime, the corrections system began departing from its rehabilitative ideologies and
focusing solely on retribution and incapacitation. At the start of the 21st Century, critical
criminologists started to identify this dramatic shift in penal philosophy as the “punitive
turn” or “the new punitiveness” (see Brown et al., 2005).
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During his presidency, Nixon also identified illegal drugs as “public enemy
number one” (Alexander, 2010, p. 48). This would plant the seed for a War on Drugs to
be developed a decade later by the Reagan Administration. Reagan’s presidential
campaign centered on two key issues: the alleged abuses of the welfare system by so
called “welfare queens” and rampant street crime (Alexander, 2010). Through his raceneutral language, Reagan crafted a platform that rested on racial animosity and class
subordination. During the 1970s and 1980s, criminologist Michael Tonry argues, “crime
issues acted both as a code word for racial animosity and as an appeal to voters who were
anxious about many changes in their lives” (as cited in Useem, 2008, p. 17). The War on
Drugs gained momentum quickly under Reagan and was further developed by the George
Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations (Alexander, 2010), as is further discussed in the
following sections. By the mid-1980s, the United States had successfully waged two wars
on its own citizens—the War on Crime and the War on Drugs—both of which would
reproduce legal and social inequalities in the age of mass incarceration.
Part II. The Face of Mass Incarceration
This section explores who is affected by mass incarceration, or in other words,
who goes to prison. Politicians, the media, and policymakers tell us that the answer is
simple—criminals go to prison. In theory, the word “criminal” is all-inclusive; it does not
discriminate on grounds of race, socioeconomic status, educational background, gender,
or age. It is also consistent with dominant notions of formal equality before the law, in
the sense that individuals who commit the same crime should expect the same processing
and punishment from the criminal justice system. However, incarceration statistics tell a
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different story. During what Wacquant calls “hyper incarceration” (2001) racial
minorities, low-level offenders, and the poor were overwhelmingly and
disproportionately swept into federal and state correctional facilities. Wacquant (2009)
describes the typical inmate during the height of mass incarceration:
In 1992, at the acme of America’s carceral boom, the typical inmate entering a
state correctional facility was a man under 30 years of age (53% of admissions) of
African-American origin (nearly 54%) who had not finished high school (for twothirds of them), imprisoned for a non-violent offence in over seven cases in ten.
(p. 14)
“In other words,” Wacquant (2009) concludes, “American jails and prisons are
overflowing with convicts who would not have been thrown behind bars 30 years ago”
(p. 15). The following sections explore how non-violent offenders, racial minorities, and
the lower class were targeted by penal legislation and the race to incarcerate.
Offense.
It is important to first look at the crimes individuals were typically convicted of
during the time of the carceral boom, followed by who was convicted of those offenses.
According to those in power, mass incarceration resulted from a surge in violent crime. If
this were true, there would have been a parallel increase in the number of individuals
sentenced to prison for committing violent offenses. Although the data confirms that the
majority of state prisoners are incarcerated for violent crimes. There was a drastic
increase in the number of persons incarcerated for drug offenses and property crimes—a
trend that can be explained for the most part by the War on Drugs.
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The War on Drugs was a massive deployment of government funds and police
tactics aimed at low-level offenders involved in the drug economy. Wacquant (2009)
succinctly explains the War on Drugs policy as a “cover for a veritable police and penal
guerrilla on sellers of narcotics and other street operators and, by extension, for the
punitive containment of the residents of the dispossessed black urban neighborhoods in
which they congregate” (p. 20). The War on Drugs identified “drugs” as the common
enemy. The policies that followed, however, targeted individual traits. The War on Drugs
was artfully crafted, cloaked in race-neutral and class-neutral language. It appeared as a
policy directed at a societal ill, a circumstance that helped it gain public approval quickly.
In reality, the most draconian anti-drug measures were selectively applied to young, black
men in poor, urban ghettos.
The effects of the War on Drugs can be directly observed in the rates of
incarceration for drug-related offenses. Before the War on Drugs, the percentage of
inmates convicted of drug offenses was relatively low: 5% in 1960 and 9% in 1980
(Wacquant, 2009, p. 19). These rates more than doubled after the launch of the War on
Drugs. From 1980 to 2003, the percentage of state prisoners incarcerated for drug-related
offenses increased from 6% to 21%. During that time, the percentage of state prisoners
incarcerated for violent offenses decreased from 59% to 51%, the proportion of property
offenders decreased from 30% to 21%, and public order offenders increased slightly from
4% to 7% (Useem & Piehl, 2008, p. 56-57). The data indicates a slight decline in the
seriousness of offenses committed by the state prison population. However, a closer look
at the total prison population shows that drug offenders are largely concentrated in
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federal prisons as opposed to state prisons. Drug offenders made up 27% of the federal
prison population in 1980 and 55% of the federal prison population in 2003. This is an
increase from 4,900 federal drug offenders in 1980 to nearly 87,000 in 2003 (Useem &
Piehl, 2008, p. 57-58).
Since the introduction of the War on Drugs, the U.S. penal system witnessed an
extreme increase in convictions of low-level, non-violent, drug offenders. The public
supported the War on Drugs as a way to combat violent crime associated with the openair drug markets in the nation’s most troubled inner cities. Instead, individuals convicted
of property and drug offenses outnumbered violent convicts two to one. According to
Wacquant (2009), this 2:1 trend of low-level convictions to violent convictions has been
present every year since 1989 (p. 14).
Race, class, and intersectionality.
Demographics of the incarcerated population confirm an overrepresentation of
minorities—namely blacks and Hispanics. Between the years of 1960 to 1995, the
incarceration rates of African Americans virtually doubled. By 1995, blacks represented
the majority of inmates entering incarceration—55%—and only a mere 7% of the U.S.
adult population (Wacquant, 2009, p. 19). Over the last 20 years, the black-white gap has
deepened further. Recent data shows that African Americans are incarcerated at 8x the
rate of whites (Wacquant, 2009; Western, 2006), with African Americans and Hispanics
accounting for roughly two-thirds of the state prison population (Western, 2006, p.16).
Table 1 displays the racial composition of the incarcerated population as compared to the
racial composition of the U.S. population.
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Table 1. Racial/Ethnic composition of incarcerated population by percentage as compared to
composition of the U.S. adult population. Source: Prison Policy Initiative (Sakala, 2014)

The term “racial minority” lacks meaning with regard to the criminal justice
system. The institutionalization of minority populations is significantly disproportionate
to the U.S. adult population. The 8:1 incarceration ratio of blacks to whites surpasses
many other social disparity indicators, such as “racial disparities in unemployment (2 to
1), nonmarital childbearing (3 to 1), infant mortality (2 to 1), and wealth (1 to 5)”
(Western, 2006, p. 16). The social disparities between blacks and whites show that racial
equality suffers in both the free and unfree populations. If the incarceration rates of
whites matched the incarceration rates of blacks, more than six million people would be
imprisoned in the United States (Western, 2006, p. 16). The data shows that young black
men are most severely affected by the policies of mass incarceration—in 2000, 8% of
black men of working age were incarcerated (Western, 2006, p. 16).
Crime statistics show that minorities do not commit more crime than whites. As
previously discussed in Part I, discriminatory policies, procedures, and legislation have
largely affected the disproportionate incarceration of minorities. Wacquant (2009) states
that black offenders are more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration than whites—
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when controlling for various factors such as seriousness of offense and prior record.
However, he claims, “such discrimination [in sentencing] clearly has not increased since
the mid-1970s and so it cannot account for the spectacular worsening of ‘racial
disproportionality’ in prison admissions in the recent period” (Wacquant, 2009, p. 20).
Rather, criminologists argue that such racial disproportionality is a direct result of a
structurally racist penal institution (Davis, 2003; Alexander, 2010; Haney Lopez, 2010).
Minority populations experience first-hand the detrimental social, political, and
civil effects of the structurally flawed justice system. Such populations are dually
disadvantaged, as the intersectionality between race and class becomes clearer. Race and
class inequalities can be traced from the bottom (i.e. the police level) to the top (i.e.
prison populations) of the penal system. Recent data has shown that 1 in 11 adult African
Americans is under some form of correctional control (Clear & Frost, 2014, p. 63).
During the height of mass incarceration—the mid-1990s—approximately 1-in-3 African
Americans lived below the U.S. official poverty line as compared to 1 in 10 Americans of
European descent (Wacquant, 2009, p. 19). It is evident that class and racial disadvantage
often intersect, resulting in many individuals being dually oppressed. To illustrate, in
1999, “a black man born in the late 1960s had a 1:5 chance of having gone to prison for
at least a year, while for men in that cohort who dropped out of high school, the risk of
imprisonment surged to a staggering 59%” (Lopez, 2010, p. 1030). By 2000, 32.4% of
young black men who dropped out of high school were incarcerated (Haney Lopez, 2010,
p. 1030).
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The excessive incarceration of less educated, low-skilled, poor, minority
populations is evident. Western (2006) states, “The 1997 survey of state and federal
prisoners shows that state inmates average fewer than 11 years of schooling. A third were
not working at the time of their incarceration, and the average wage of the remainder is
much lower than that of other men with the same level of education” (p. 15-16). Of those
incarcerated, roughly 60% of inmates earned less than $1,000 per month prior to their
arrest, and roughly 30% were unemployed (Levenson & Gordon, 2007, p. 67). Based on
these statistics, it is not difficult to see how the pay-to-stay option is outside the purview
of nearly 90% of the incarcerated population. In other words, there is no equal access to
this public service. Pay-to-stay programs help further divide the incarcerated population
along lines of racial and class privilege.
Part III. California’s Prison Crisis: Prison Realignment and the Fiscal Emergency
Part III explores California’s justice system and relevant developments—
specifically prison realignment, the correctional budget, and economic crisis—that have
legitimized the pay-to-stay jail program.
A large portion of the U.S. incarcerated population resides in California’s 33
prisons, 40 camps, and 12 community correctional facilities (Bailey & Hayes, 2006). As
one can imagine, it is extremely expensive for California’s vast correctional system to
operate (see Figure 4). Governor Brown recently proposed to increase the 2014-15
correctional budget to nearly $10 billion, an increase of 13% over the previous year. It
was projected that the state would spend $62,396 annually per inmate (California Budget
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Brief, 2014). Figure 3 displays how California’s correctional budget has continued to
grow since the late 1970s.

Figure 3. California’s annual expenditures on corrections compared to the percentage
of total state expenditures. Source: Public Policy Institute of California (2015)

According to the California Budget Project’s 2014-15 budget brief, the budget for
the correctional system is continuing to increase despite the implementation of
California’s Public Safety Realignment (AB 109). Introduced in 2011, the goal of prison
realignment was to decrease prison overcrowding by shifting the management of lowlevel (i.e., non-violent, non-serious, and non-sex) offenders away from the state to the
county. In its 2011 decision of the Brown v Plata case, the U.S. Supreme Court
demanded that California reduce its inmate population to 137.5% of “design capacity”,
which would require the release of 33,000 inmates. Within the first full year of
realignment, the California institutional population had decreased from 144,500 to
119,000. The decline has since stabilized, leaving state corrections facilities at roughly
148% capacity (PPIC, 2014). Initially, realignment also caused a decrease in the state
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correctional budget from $9.7 billion to $8.8 billion. The decrease was, unfortunately,
short-lived. With the California now facing a $10 billion correctional budget, pay-to-stay
programs seem to be gaining increasing support among local policymakers as a way of
combatting the cost of incarceration. California’s prison realignment is discussed in more
detail later on in this chapter, but first there must be an understanding of incarceration
trends in California.
California closely followed national trends throughout the era of hyperincarceration and has been identified as having one of the largest prison and jail
populations in the United States. Between the years 1990 and 2005, the state prison
population multiplied at a rate three times faster than California’s general adult
population. By 2005, the state prison population had reached 167,698 (Bailey & Hayes,
2006, p. 1). Like nationwide penal trends, California’s incarceration spree
disproportionately affected minorities and the poor, and has been prompted by the
infamous Wars on Drugs and Crime to target low-level offenders. According to
Wacquant (2009), “California quadrupled its prison population between 1980 and 1993;
76% of that growth was due to the incarceration of nonviolent offenders. This
disproportion was even more glaring in federal penitentiaries, where 94% of the 40,000
new inmates admitted in the course of a year during that period entered for nonviolent
offenses” (p. 15). Punitive penal policies such as the 1994 Three Strikes law and the 1994
Truth in Sentencing Act (Bailey & Hayes, 2006) severely affected the size and structure
of California’s massive prison regime—and simultaneously worsened racial and class
disparities in the correctional system.
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Latinos make up the largest incarcerated population in California—38% in 2005
(Baily & Hayes, 2006, p. 1). However, incarceration rates show a rate of over 5,000 per
100,000 for African American men in California, compared to roughly 1,000 per 100,000
Latino men, and less than 1,000 per 100,000 white men (Bailey & Hayes, 2006, p. 5).
African American men in California are incarcerated seven times more than whites and
4.5 times more than Latinos (Bailey & Hayes, 2006, p. 4). According to the ACLU report
Public Safety Realignment: California at a Crossroads, “A higher proportion of African
Americans are incarcerated in California today than were blacks in Apartheid South
Africa” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012). The disproportionate incarceration
of disadvantaged populations—exacerbated by the implementation of strict penal
policies—has led to the penal crisis in California.
California’s incarcerated population has outgrown the design capacity of the
state’s penal institutions. In 2005, California’s penal facilities were 186% occupied,
meaning the system was operating at nearly double its design capacity (Bailey & Hayes,
2006, p. 9). Although a large majority of states had overcrowded penal institutions,
California’s was by far the most shocking. California’s prisons were so chronically
overcrowded that it was considered a human rights issue and a “humanitarian crisis”
(Simon, 2014, p. 121). Initially filed in 2001, a lawsuit claimed prisoner health care in
California to be “grossly inadequate” (PPIC, 2014, p. 1) due to overcrowding. The
torturous conditions of California’s hyper-overcrowding were eventually brought before
the Supreme Court. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Brown v. Plata case
that California’s prison overcrowding did indeed constitute cruel and unusual
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punishment, and gave the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) two years to decrease its prison population. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote:
“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity […] A prison that deprives prisoners of
basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of
human dignity and has no place in civilized society” (as quoted in Simon, 2014, p. 133).
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, Governor Brown signed the
Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109), signaling a significant change in California’s
justice system. AB 109 called for devolution of criminal supervision to the local level,
decentralization of corrections, and essentially limited the responsibility of the
government for marginalized populations. Implemented on October 1, 2011, AB 109 was
composed of the following two penal changes. First, “non-non-non” offenders—“nonserious, non-violent, non-sex-registerable felony offenders”—with no prior convictions
would remain under county supervision, instead of that of the state prison. Second, a new
“post-release community supervision” program was implemented for non-non-non
offenders, while state parole was abolished for many other offenses (Hopper, DooleySammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 7). Both changes greatly shifted the correctional
responsibility from the state level to the county level. The ACLU report supports this
shift: “Realignment is based upon a fundamental acknowledgement that counties are
better positioned to integrate public health and social services as part of rehabilitation and
reentry in ways that the state cannot” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 3).
However, in order to measure the actual success of realignment and the increase in
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rehabilitative efforts at the county level, there must be an evaluation of county allocations
of AB 109 funds.
The goal of prison realignment was “to reserve expensive state prisons for
individuals convicted of serious offenses and to encourage counties to develop and
implement evidence-based practices and alternatives to incarceration to limit future
crimes and victims” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 3). Therefore,
counties should direct their AB 109 funds toward alternative and rehabilitative programs.
Instead, the ACLU reported in 2012, that “at least 32 of California’s 58 counties have
plans to expand jail capacity using AB 109 funds or other tax dollars, even though
realignment provides more effective and affordable options for addressing jail
overcrowding” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 6). There are several issues
with the implementation of AB 109 and a lack of regulation of the funds distributed to
California’s counties.
According to the AB 109 legislation, each county is required to assemble a Local
Community Corrections Partnership (LCCP). The executive committee of each LCCP
includes prominent members of the local criminal justice system— such as the county’s
probation chief, district attorney, sheriff, and police chief, to name a few. Each county’s
LCCP and Board of Supervisors is then expected to draft a realignment implementation
plan detailing how the county would disburse AB 109 funds and how they would
supervise their “non-non-non” offenders (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012).
Unfortunately, California’s procedure for distributing AB 109 funds has been
inconsistent so far. The state’s formula for fund allocation looked closely at each
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county’s average daily prison population (ADP) of low-level, non-violent offenders. It
did take into consideration the county’s population and successful probation programs,
but ADP was 60% of the formula (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012).
Those counties with a higher incarceration rate of low-level, non-violent
offenders received more realignment funding from the state—a development that
essentially rewarded the most punitive, non-rehabilitative counties. On the other hand,
counties that had historically lower ADP rates and were more committed to alternative
sentencing methods were given less funding. Although AB 109 encouraged counties to
allocate funds toward more cost-effective and evidence-based alternatives to
incarceration, there was no formal oversight of the spending—leaving counties to spend
realignment funds at their own liberty. This is concerning as the largest amounts of
funding went to counties that were already relying too heavily on the penal system as a
method for dealing with low-level, non-violent offenders. With virtually no oversight, it
is not surprising that 24 of the 25 counties that received the most AB 109 funding—
approximately $45.1 million total—have plans for jail expansion (Hopper, DooleySammuli, & Evans, 2012, p.12, 15). Expansion costs include “7,002 new jail beds and
722 new corrections-related staff” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 15). In
essence, California’s prison realignment has become a state-funded expansion of county
jails.
As previously discussed, realignment did have an impact on state incarceration
rates. Within the first eight months there was a 17% drop in the state prison population
from 164,200 to 135,800, a record low since 1995 (Males, 2012, p.4). However, from
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2011 to 2013, the county jail population increased by roughly 9,000 inmates (Lofstrom &
Raphael, 2013, p. 3), thus absorbing almost 1/3 of the reduction in the state prison
population. With counties planning to expand jails and open thousands of new inmate
beds, the state prison population is slowly being displaced to the local level. When
evaluating only prison incarceration rates, it may appear that AB 109 is successfully
reducing the prison population. Although realignment is having a deflationary effect on
state prisons, it is simply relocating substantial fractions of the prison population to
county jail facilities.
It is important to evaluate the effect of AB 109 on the county jail population
within the discussion of pay-to-stay, as they both exist in the same realm of penal policy.
The two policies have several similarities: they are affecting the county level of the
California justice system, they are characterized as solutions to the ‘overcrowding
problem’, and they are money-saving reactions to economic crisis. The relationship
between realignment and the pay-to-stay program is further discussed in Chapter 4, along
with a case study of the Fremont pay-to-stay program.
Chapter II. Rich Prison, Poor Prisoner:
The Prison Economy and Emerging Two-Tiered Justice System
The United States has a long history of exploiting incarcerated populations for
financial gain. Pay-to-stay programs are the newest development in the economy of the
prison, stemming from recent financial crises (namely, the great recession of 2008 and its
aftermath), and broader changes in economic conditions. Total state corrections
expenditures have drastically increased over the last few decades. Between 1982 and
2010, annual state correctional spending increased from $15 billion to $48.4 billion, with
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the most expensive year reaching $53.5 billion (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014, p. 1).
In this respect, it is important to understand pay-to-stay as a successor in the historical
lineage of prison industry and for-profit punishment in the United States.
Part I of this chapter explores the history of the prison economy in the United
States, beginning in the mid-1600s and continuing on in to the 21st Century. It presents a
clear timeline demarcating the evolution of the prison industry from slavery, to convict
leasing, and prison privatization. The pay-to-stay program is to be understood as one
instance in a long historical sequence of profit-making systems within the prison. Part II
discusses how inmates are being held financially responsible for their crimes and,
subsequently, how the wealthy and the poor are divided into two separate and unequal
justice systems. The pay-to-stay program is merely one of many methods used by the
justice system to separate the rich from the poor—such as the bail system, alternative
sentencing programs, fines, and restitution. Situating the pay-to-stay program in the
context of the prison economy speaks to the acceptability of the program and generally
high public tolerance for inmate exploitation.
This chapter aims to address the following three questions: (1) Why is pay-to-stay
accepted as a viable solution to the prison crisis? (2) How does the criminal justice
system separate the rich and the poor? (3) What other penal procedures place the
financial burden on the offender? The U.S. penal system has undeniably reached a
breaking point. Prisons and jails are operating at well over capacity both spatially and
financially. Offenders are herded into vastly overcrowded facilities where rehabilitation
is no longer a viable goal of incarceration. State policies, such as AB 109 in California,
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have attempted to address the overcrowding issue with little to no success. Governments
have also tried to cut correctional spending, a development which typically results in
fewer educational, rehabilitative, and treatment programs for inmates. With the penal
system essentially busting at the seams and deepening federal and state debts, officials
have been forced to address the financial effects of mass incarceration. Rather than
questioning the fundamentally flawed system, they have crafted ways to shift the burden
onto the offender. This neoliberal response to the prison crisis—making the offender bear
a larger fraction of the correctional costs to save taxpayer dollars—has been widely
accepted by the public. There is a historical trend of publicly accepted mistreatment of
racial minorities, the underclass, and offenders. This broader trend, discussed in the
following chapter, sheds further light on the newfound acceptance of the pay-to-stay jail
program.
Part 1. The Economy of Prison: Making Money from Incarcerated Populations
Historically, there has been a structural relationship between systems of
incarceration and the economy. Influenced by Marxism, Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939)
theorized about this political economy of punishment prior to the carceral boom. They
argued that punishment is to be understood as an integral element to each historically
determined mode of production:
Every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to
its productive relationships. It is thus necessary to investigate the origin and fate
of penal systems, the use or avoidance of specific punishments, and the intensity
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of penal practices as they are determined by social forces, above all by economic
and then fiscal forces. (as quoted in De Giorgi, 2012, p. 41-42)
Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) went on to argue two important points: (1) the penal
apparatus has a specific economic function within society, and (2) punishment reinforces
the class struggle between the rich and the poor, both of which are relevant arguments to
the current dialogue of prison industry and mass incarceration.
The economy of punishment can be seen in its simplest form through the
industrialization of the prison. Hallett (2004) explains that the relationship between
commerce and criminals in the United States dates back to the colonial period:
“commerce [in the American colonies] involved the prospective use of captives’ labor to
expand the colonial power of Great Britain at virtually no cost to the state, while also
providing a mechanism for the exile of the ‘dangerous classes’” (p. 49). The captive
population was exploited for political power and economic gain.
The United States has a prominent history of for-profit imprisonment and
production that can be traced back to the roots of slavery. Slavery in the United States
dated from 1619 to 1865, and represented a system of violence, bondage, and complete
domination over the African American population. The United States enslaved
population peaked around 4 million, and represented an “unfree” labor force responsible
for the production of tobacco, rice, cotton, and sugar in pre-industrial America
(Wacquant, 2001). Southern manufacturers and plantation owners relied heavily on
slavery for production, as it was cheaper than a free workforce and escape was
punishable by death. Plantation owners were monetarily invested in their slaves, as they
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bought, fed, clothed, and sheltered them. Nonetheless, slaves were severely mistreated,
abused, and violated. Slavery as a system of direct economic exploitation was eventually
abolished in 1865 with President Lincoln’s Thirteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment simultaneously dismantled slavery and legalized
prison labor. It stated, “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States” [emphasis added] (as quoted in Hallett, 2006, p. 1). After emancipation, a new
racial order was produced. Alexander (2010) claimed, “[c]onvicts had no meaningful
legal rights at this time and no effective redress […] they were understood, quite,
literally, to be slaves of the state” (p. 31). Blacks were soon targeted by post-slavery
legislation as dangerous individuals in need of penal discipline. Thus, the Black Codes
and Jim Crow laws were implemented, with the goal of criminalizing and controlling
once again, the African American population. “As African Americans obtained political
power and began the long march toward greater social and economic equality, whites
reacted with panic and outrage,” Alexander (2010) explained, “[…] [o]nce again,
vagrancy laws and other laws defining activities such as ‘mischief’ and ‘insulting
gestures’ as crimes were enforced vigorously against blacks” (p. 30-31). Prisons quickly
filled with “free” African Americans and the poor where they swiftly reentered a system
of forced labor. Thus, the convict lease system was born, fueling a racialized system of
forced labor through the 1920s.
Under convict leasing, prison labor was auctioned off to the highest bidder.
Convicts were forced to work off their arbitrary sentences and fines at lumber camps,
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railroads, plantations, and with other private contractors in the South (Alexander, 2010).
Private contractors preferred prisoners because they were cheap and expendable. As a
result, concern for health care and safety decreased while abuse, negligence, and human
rights violations increased. Convict leasing protected the system of production in the
United States and also reestablished legalized slavery and racial dominance.
In the North, prisons were also exploiting prison labor under the Pennsylvania and
Auburn prison systems. The Pennsylvania prison system relied strictly on penitence and
isolation. Prisoners were kept in single occupancy cells and served the duration of their
sentence in complete silence. Private companies contracted with these prisons to purchase
prison labor. The contractors would provide all the materials and training (Selman &
Leighton, 2010), and prisoners would manufacture their products in complete solitude.
The goal was that the prison, in essence, would pay for itself. The Auburn prison system
in New York required prisoners to conduct factory-work in complete silence during the
day and were isolated in single occupancy cells at night. The Auburn system grew in
popularity, as it was cheaper and more efficient to contract assembly-line work. It was
also highly adaptable to industrialization. According to Robert Johnson, the Auburn
system produced “a crude urban creature, a tame proletarian worker, oppressed and angry
but hungry and compliant: a man for the times forged by a prison for the times” (as
quoted by Selman & Leighton, 2010, p.7).
Initially, prison labor involved prisons contracting out prisoners to private
companies. Soon, six different systems of prison labor emerged: contract, piece-price,
leasing, state-account, state-use, and public works (Chang & Thompkins, 2002). Each
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system was equally exploitative, relying on the work of the “unfree” to produce capital
for private contractors, and in some cases generating revenue for the very institutions in
which they were incarcerated. The Auburn prison implemented the contract system,
whereby private contractors provided the equipment, materials, and supervised
production within the prison. In the piece-pricing system, used by the Pennsylvania
prison, contractors issued the materials to the prisoners and paid the prison for each unit
produced. The lease system was used mostly in the South, and involved auctioning off
prison labor to the highest bidder who would then be responsible for the complete control
of the prison workforce. The state-account and state-use systems mirrored the leasing
system but was managed and paid for by the state, rather than a private investor. The
state-account system sold its products publicly and the state-use system sold its products
only to state institutions. Lastly, public works and ways used inmate labor in the
construction of state infrastructure, such as bridges, railroads, and state prisons (Chang &
Thompkins, 2002).
At the end of the 19th Century, labor unions began challenging the convict lease
and prison labor systems. Prisoners were cheap labor with fewer restrictions on their
exploitability, no rights, and complete lack of freedom; for this reason, private
contractors were leasing convicts rather than hiring through labor unions. As economic
conditions worsened, workers saw prison laborers as a threat to their livelihood. In
Tennessee, free miners destroyed prison camps and shipped prisoners out. This economic
unrest eventually led to the demise of the convict lease system in the 1920s (Selman &
Leighton, 2010). It was the economic downturn that ended the leasing system, rather than
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concerns for basic human rights. Still, some forms of prison labor continued on well into
the 20th Century, and then intensified again with the introduction of private prisons in the
1980s.
Incarceration rates remained fairly stable between the 1920s and the 1960s.
However, during the last quarter of the 20th Century racially motivated wars on crime
and drugs fueled a massive race to incarcerate, reconfiguring the landscape of the prison
economy. As Selman and Leighton (2010) explain, “the loss of jobs in the United States
due to processes of globalization added to the need for prisons to stimulate economic
development while at the same time providing an increasing number of unemployed who
could be swept into the system” (p. 9). Again, minority populations and the poor were
disproportionately targeted. The punitive turn and the need for prison industry created
such a high demand for prisons that the United States government was unable to keep up.
At the end of the 20th Century, the U.S. prison system entered a fiscal crisis caused by
the sharp increase in incarceration coupled with the cost of housing prisoners (Hallett,
2004). President Reagan’s neoliberal policies, free market ideology, and push toward
privatization opened the door for private prisons. The first decade of the 21st Century saw
an unprecedented growth in the number of prisoners being held in private prisons.
Private prisons existed in moderation between the years of 1850 and 1950. States
such as California, Oklahoma, Texas, and Michigan had private prisons that utilized
prison labor to balance the cost of the facility. These prisons were abolished in 1950, due
to widespread abuse of prisoners (Price, 2006). However, the fiscal crisis of the
correctional system caused a rebirth of prison privatization. In 1979, the Prison Industry
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Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) reestablished the right for private
corporations to contract prison labor and market prisoner-made products across state
lines. Government officials, including Chief Justice Warren Burger, and prison
executives began to push for “private sector industry under the rhetoric of rehabilitation”
(Chang & Thompkins, 2002, p. 55).
The Reagan administration welcomed the private sector throughout the 1980s.
This included “sanitation, health care, security, fire protection, and education” (Welch &
Turner, 2008, p. 58). The assumption was that privatization would encourage
competition, improve quality, and reduce cost (Welch & Turner, 2008). After the passing
of the PIECP, government officials, political party elites, and experts in the field of
corrections began developing a plan to privatize prisons as a way to combat
overcrowding while supposedly saving taxpayer dollars (Camp, 2005).
Private corporations began to have a financial interest in prisons; prisons meant
construction contracts, a growing market for goods and services, and the increased use of
prison labor (Davis, 2003). Today, private prisons are the fourth largest prison system in
the United States (Hallett, 2006). Between the years of 1999 and 2010, the private prison
inmate population grew by 80% while the overall inmate population grew “only” by 18%
(Aviram, 2015). By 2010, roughly 128,000 prisoners were being held in private prisons
in the United States (Aviram, 2015). The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and
the GEO Group are the largest private correctional corporations in the United States.
These corporations use their monetary influence to lobby for privatization legislation and

38

punitive policies to ensure their own success (Price, 2006). Despite the recent economic
recession, the CCA’s net income reached $162.5 million in 2011 (Aviram, 2015).
Despite declining crime rates and the proven ineffectiveness of prisons to reduce
crime, legislative figures continue to pump billions of dollars in to the prison system
every year. Human rights violations, racial oppression, and class subordination continue
to thrive under the current economy of mass incarceration and prison industry. As long as
private corporations and other stakeholders continue to generate millions in profits from
prison industry, the drive to dismantle mass incarceration will be stunted. The prison
economy cements failed prison policies in place by making money from the incarcerated,
and reinforces the notion that “the free market works best when people aren't free”
(Welch & Turner, 2008, p. 64). This sentiment has persisted through the institutions of
slavery, prison labor, and convict leasing, and is now seen in the expansion of private
prisons and the introduction of pay-to-stay jails.
Part II. Placing the Financial Burden on the Offender
The pay-to-stay program is not the first system to blatantly discriminate against
offenders based on socioeconomic status, nor is it the first to demand compensation from
an offender. There are many avenues throughout the justice system that allow
‘undeserving’ offenders—namely, those who can afford it—to avoid the humiliating
experience of incarceration. This section discusses ways in which the rich can escape the
poor man’s justice system due to their ability to post bail and pay for services such as
ankle monitoring, community supervision, and pay-to-stay jail cells. This section also
discusses how poor offenders are continually forced to pay incarceration and treatment
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fees that they simply cannot afford, preventing them from escaping the revolving door of
the justice system.
Offenders may be ‘innocent until proven guilty’ in the court of law, but they
begin paying for their crimes even before a verdict is made. During arraignment, judges
have sole discretion over preventive detention and the setting of bail. The goal of
preventive detention is to keep defendants incapacitated before going to trial, thereby
preventing the commission of further crimes, escape, or tampering with evidence
(Walker, 2011). If not remanded to jail, the judge may set a price on the defendant’s
freedom—also known as bail. If the defendant is able to pay the price, he or she can
escape incapacitation until a verdict of innocent or guilty is determined in a court of law.
In the 1960s, the bail system began receiving considerable backlash for its
unequal treatment of disadvantaged populations. The plight of the poor was suddenly at
the forefront of the civil rights movement. During this time, nearly half of all persons in
jail were awaiting trial (Walker, 2011, p. 147). Civil activists denounced the oppressive
nature the bail system, and the criminal justice system as a whole, against minority and
poor populations. The bail reform movement reached a partial success with the adoption
of release on recognizance (ROR), which permitted offenders with ties to the
community, family, and work to be released from supervision without bail. ROR,
however, still discriminated against nonworking individuals and the lower class. After the
bail reform movement, the number of persons in jail awaiting trial decreased from 52% in
1967 to 28.2% in 2002, before increasing again to 43% in 2004 (Walker, 2011, p. 148).
According to Walker (2011) “the reversal is a result of both a more punitive public mood
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and probably the impact of worsening economic conditions, as many defendants cannot
meet even minimal money bail conditions” (p. 148). Today, bail is still being used to
incapacitate offenders and is determined using criteria such as prior record, employment
status, community ties, and family involvement—all of which discriminate against
marginalized populations, ensuring they remain in jail until trial.
California has adopted a presumptive bail system. Rather than evaluating each
individual for risk or likeliness to reoffend, judges often assign bail according to the
county schedule. Scheduled bail amounts can vary widely from county to county; the
presumptive bail amount for a drug possession charge can range anywhere from $5,000
(e.g. Fresno) to $25,000 (e.g. San Bernardino) (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans,
2012, p. 20). The fluctuating presumptive bail amounts across county lines may mean the
difference between jail time and freedom for some individuals. For instance, a low-risk,
first-time offender may be able to afford bail in Fresno, but would be held in San
Bernardino jail until trial. As explained by Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, and Evans (2012),
“defendants with little money or collateral to post for bail, but with stable employment,
strong community ties and no history of violence or other risk-predictive factors may
nonetheless be forced to remain for weeks or even months in jail pending trial simply
because the local bail schedule dictates a bail amount beyond their means” (p. 21). The
presumptive bail method completely disregards any mitigating factors, leaving financial
status as the sole determining factor between jail time and release. When the justice
system relies on the financial terms of bail, race and class disproportionalities are
reproduced and amplified.
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Pay-to-stay programs can be seen as an extension of the bail system. Those with
financial means are able to remove themselves from the poor man’s criminal justice
system. Whether by posting bail before trial or paying for an upgraded jail cell after trial,
privileged social groups experience a less humiliating, less damaging extension of the
justice system. Those who are unable to pay their way essentially convert to slaves of the
state.
Those with economic means escape incarceration through the bail system or by
being penalized with fines and restitution. Marginalized populations—such as minorities
and the poor—often face disparate outcomes of the penal system: “Latinos and black
defendants are more likely than white defendants to be held in jail because of inability to
post bail” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 22). Although the prisons and
jails are often filled with inmates without the financial means to escape, a recent trend of
levying fees against the incarcerated has emerged.
Going to jail or prison is expensive. According to The Institute for Southern
Studies (2009), “[b]y 2004, about one-third of the county jails in the United States had
policies charging inmates for their own incarceration” (para. 3). Inmates are increasingly
invoiced for the ‘luxuries’ of prison—such as expensive telephone calls, medical
services, and in some states “room and board” fees (Evans, 2009). Across the country,
prison and jail facilities are charging inmates for detention. Unlike pay-to-stay, inmates
are not paying for upgraded services, they are being billed for standard jail time. In some
counties, inmates are charged a “cost of care per day” which can be $45 to $60 per day
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depending on the area (Evans, 2009). This calculates to $1,350 to $1,800 per month for
incarceration.
Other jails and prisons find alternative methods for charging inmates. Prisons in
North Carolina, Florida, and Virginia charge inmates fees for breaking the rules. Under
the infamous Sheriff Arpaio, the Maricopa County jail in Arizona charges inmates $1.25
per day for food (Evans, 2009). In Connecticut, the state requires inmates to pay the
following fees for the use of programs and services within the incarceration facility:
$3.00 per course of elective education, $3.00 per course of vocational training, $10 per
extended family visit, $3.00 per inmate initiated visit to the doctor, $3.00 per dental
procedure, $3.00 per eyeglass and prescription, and the actual cost of drug test if results
are positive (Reinhart, 2006). Although these fees may seem trivial, it is important to
remember that the fees are placed on inmates and families of inmates who likely cannot
afford them. Even if inmates are working while in prison, the average minimum wage for
state prisoners for non-industry work is $0.93 per day; the overall average maximum
wage paid to state prisoners is $4.73 per day (Wagner, 2013, Section III).
The costs of incarceration are often transposed on to the families of the
incarcerated. Family members may put money on to their loved one’s books to pay for
food and services, send care packages, and pay for pre-paid phone cards—all of which
can be costly. In 2011, the Montgomery Jail in Ohio reported an annual revenue of
$370,000 from the sales of pre-paid phone cards (“Annual Phone Revenue”, 2011). In
some states, inmates need money for toothpaste, winter clothes, electricity, and toilet
paper—basic needs that the penal system, a public service funded by taxes, should be
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providing (Wagner, 2014). Instead, the costly burden is placed on inmates, and often the
families of inmates, who simply cannot afford it.
Once released from incarceration, individuals are frequently charged for postrelease services. In Massachusetts, offenders must pay $50 to $65 a month to the
probation department to cover supervision costs (Rosenburg, 2011). The court requires
probation supervision; failing to meet with the probation officer can result in jail time,
meaning the probation department is collecting fees on a mandatory service. Sex
offenders incur even more out-of-pocket costs post-incarceration. Ricky May, Director of
Treatment and Evaluation Services in Colorado claims sex offenders are required to have
a “sex-offense-specific mental-health evaluation” for which they must pay $1,000 to
$2,000 (Lechtenberg, 2015). Then, the sex offender must pay for treatment—the average
person attends sessions five times per month—which costs roughly $275 per month
(Kepros in Lechtenberg, 2015). Although some offenders may receive financial
assistance from the Department of Probation, they are solely responsible for making sure
the treatment bill is paid in full. Some sex offenders are mandated to wear tracking
devices and complete polygraphs, both of which they must also pay for. Polygraphs are
generally conducted twice a year and cost about $250 per session (May in Lechtenberg,
2015). Although this example is specific to Colorado, the excessively punitive treatment
of sex offenders can be found nationwide. Charging sex offenders for post-release
treatment and monitoring is a growing phenomenon across the United States.
Charging inmates for goods and services in jail or prison is becoming increasingly
popular and widespread. By invoicing inmates for prison expenses and forcing them to
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pay for post-release supervision and treatment, the criminal justice system is working to
keep the poor impoverished. Placing the financial burden of incarceration on an already
disadvantaged population of offenders preserves the presence of the criminal justice
system in the lives of minorities and the poor.
Chapter III. Case Study of Pay-to-Stay Jail in Fremont, California
This chapter details the case study of Fremont’s pay-to-stay jail program. First,
the research methods and limitations of the study are discussed. Then, Part I briefly
describes the history of the pay-to-stay program in California. Demographic, economic,
and geographic information relevant to Fremont and Alameda County is discussed in Part
II. Such information is essential to understanding why Fremont implemented a pay-tostay program and also helps project how successful the program will be. Part III details
the inception of the pay-to-stay program inside Fremont’s jail facility. This includes
economic and sustainability issues that led to the proposal, adoption, and subsequent
implementation of the pay-to-stay program. Lastly, Part IV evaluates the eligibility
requirements and catalogs the application process for the Fremont pay-to-stay program.
The pay-to-stay acceptance process illustrates which economic, ethnic, and social groups
actually have access to the program.
Method
Data Source.
The goal of this study was to document the implementation, eligibility
requirements, and application process of California’s pay-to-stay programs. To do so, a
case study of the Fremont Detention Facility’s pay-to-stay program was conducted. The
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Fremont location was chosen because it is the only pay-to-stay program in California’s
Bay Area. I chose the nearest pay-to-stay program, Fremont, because I was familiar with
the area’s history and population, and because I believed my connections to local scholars
and professionals in the criminal justice field would strengthen the study. The Fremont
pay-to-stay program was also of particular interest because it was implemented in 2011,
the same year in which California’s AB 109 Public Safety Realignment was enacted.
The study used an archival approach coupled with theoretical analysis to evaluate
the implementation, operation, and application process of Fremont’s pay-to-stay program.
The archive included: Fremont City Council records, the Pay-to-Stay Proposal, the
Fremont Pay-to-Stay website, Fremont City Newsletter Publications, Fremont’s
Sustainability Plan, application and eligibility documents, the Fremont Pay-to-Stay
Program Policy, and local media coverage. Some information was also obtained through
a personal correspondence with the manager of the Fremont Detention Facility.
Procedure.
The research process began by talking to local professionals in the field of
corrections and criminal justice. I reached out to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the City of Fremont, the Fremont Detention
Facility, Fremont City Council, local media groups, and local criminal justice
organizations. The search produced two important contacts, a deputy chief at the CDCR
and the manager of the Fremont Detention Facility. Personal correspondence with these
officials was beneficial to the study, as they revealed where to find essential primary
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sources, gave important background details, and provided the official Pay-to-Stay
Program Policy on record with the Fremont Police Department.
The next level of research began at the Fremont pay-to-stay program website. The
website briefly described the pay-to-stay program and provided links to all the necessary
paperwork to apply for the program, such as the application, eligibility requirements,
required documents, and rules and regulations. Further research was conducted through
the Fremont City Council and the City of Fremont’s online resources. Fremont City
Council minutes documented the Pay-to-Stay Proposal and its pathway to
implementation. The City of Fremont archive provided the history of and original
documentation from the Fremont Sustainability Study and subsequent Fremont
Sustainability Study Action Plan, as well as Fremont City Newsletters that were
published during the time the pay-to-stay program was being implemented. Lastly, local
and national media coverage shed light on the broader history of pay-to-stay in California
as well as any social support or backlash that followed.
This study utilized a case study analytical approach. The concepts and theories of
chapters I and II were applied and used to describe the Fremont Pay-to-Stay Program, the
case study. More specifically, this was an intrinsic case study, meaning the main goal of
the study was to understand and investigate the details of the Fremont case only. The indepth case study of Fremont was conducted through a content analysis of primary
documents, a general program assessment, and a theoretical analysis of related historical
trends.
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Limitations
This study is limited most in its theoretical nature. Rather than utilizing a truly
empirical framework, this study developed a theoretical analysis to explain the existence
of pay-to-stay jail programs in the U.S. The theoretical analysis was constructed using
historical data, social and penal theory, and the documentation of primary sources.
Together, these pieces formed a theoretical framework that will hopefully be relevant and
useful to future pay-to-stay research. Theoretical studies are equally important as
empirical studies, and aim to explain complex social phenomena that may otherwise be
difficult to measure.
Also limiting is the lack of access to data on pay-to-stay programs inside as well
as outside California. Unfortunately, pay-to-stay inmate demographics and statistics are
not publicly available. I attempted to access these data through personal correspondence
with jail administrators, but was unsuccessful. Inmate data would add reliability to this
and any future pay-to-stay study. However, Fremont pay-to-stay data would reflect dates
between October 2011 and 2015. This short range of data may not have produced
significant results or represented the affected population accurately. Although
quantitative data was not available, a steady paper trail of the program’s implementation,
policy, and procedures provided a wealth of knowledge.
Once pay-to-stay data become publicly available, future research should focus on
providing a comparative, empirical analysis of several pay-to-stay programs in
California. I suggest developing a comparative study of long standing pay-to-stay
programs in California using qualitative and quantitative data analysis. Programs such as
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Pasadena, which has been in operation for over two decades, or Beverly Hills would have
significant demographic and historical data to draw upon. Qualitative analysis can be
collected through structured interviews with inmates and local correctional
administrators, and can be combined with a quantitative analysis of inmate
demographics.
Part I. History of the Pay-to-Stay Jail Program
The literature regarding pay-to-stay jail programs is extremely limited, with
virtually no peer-reviewed journal articles. There are also no demographic data publicly
available on pay-to-stay inmates. Considering the implications of pay-to-stay, it is
especially concerning that such program data are not readily available. It would seem that
a controversial policy such as pay-to-stay would generate attention among scholars and
the public. The eerie silence surrounding pay-to-stay is as disturbing as the policy itself.
Without access to vital data, the history of the pay-to-stay jail program is thus constructed
from a narrow field of scholarly work, media coverage, and related California legislation.
Pay-to-stay jail programs have been present in California for over 20 years, but
have largely managed to stay out of sight. Some states have implemented “room and
board” fees—as discussed in Chapter II—but few have designed separate facilities for
wealthier inmates. California’s optional pay-to-stay jails appear to be the first of their
kind in creating a “two-tiered jail system” (Buchanan, 2007). There is not an accurate
count of how many pay-to-stay programs exist in the state because they are
independently run by city police departments as a separate “service”, however, it is
estimated that more than a dozen were in operation by 2007 (Steinhauer, 2007).
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When the state of California introduced the AB 109 “Public Safety Realignment”
legislation in October of 2011, county jails began to prepare for an influx of inmates to
their already overcrowded facilities. In October 2013, AB 986 was approved, allowing
city jails to use flash incarceration tactics to deal with post-release community
supervision violators (Assembly Bill No. 986 § 3000.08, 3453-3454, 2013). During the
proposal of AB 986 to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, the committee also
discussed pay-to-stay programs as a viable option to deal with minor offenders. “The
Glendale Police Department jail,” they examined, “has collected more than $1.5 million
in fees associated with inmates who opt to pay to stay at the facility” (California State
Assembly, 2013, p. 5). Between 2011 and 2013, over 17,000 inmates paid the $85 per
day fee to stay in the Glendale facility—which is “a major step up from crowded Los
Angeles County facilities” (California State Assembly, 2013, p. 6). Although the
assembly made no ruling on the pay-to-stay program, they certainly spoke of pay-to-stay
as a money-saving innovation.
The Pasadena pay-to-stay jail was opened in the early 1990s under the slogan
“bad things happen to good people” (Buchanan, 2007), a slogan suggesting that certain
populations undeservedly fall prey to the justice system while the overwhelming
incarceration of disadvantaged populations goes unquestioned. As described by
Buchanan (2007), “the pay-to-stay upgrade is said to serve the goals of incarceration by
locking up first-time offenders ‘without unduly exposing otherwise law-abiding citizens
to the criminal element’” (p. 62). In this sense, pay-to-stay is a privilege for those upper-
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class criminals believed to have made a mistake or who were simply in the wrong place
at the wrong time.
The pay-to-stay incarceration experience differs greatly from that of general
population inmates. Paying inmates reside in their own cells, and in some instances are
“‘allowed to watch television or select movies from the video library. They can ride the
exercise bike, sip coffee and use the bathroom in privacy. Most important, they are kept
away from others in the facility who could be murderers and rapists’” (Buchanan, 2007,
p. 61-62). Inmates who pay are able to preserve their self-esteem, dignity, and sense of
integrity. But not all who can afford to pay-to-stay are eligible for the program. In some
pay-to-stay jails, of the inmates who can afford the cost, only those who are able to pass a
screening interview are accepted (Buchanan, 2007). This essentially gives the jail
administrators the discretion to accept or reject any applicant for any undisclosed reason.
Municipal Judge Gregory O’Brien suggested that “otherwise respectable citizens” who
are eligible for pay-to-stay are easy to identify. “I think if you go down and look at the …
inmates down at County jail,” he said, “you’ll see very few who fit [the pay-to-stay]
profile” (Buchanan, 2007, p. 63).
Proponents of pay-to-stay programs and jail administrators do not
straightforwardly identify the target audience of pay-to-stay. Yet, it is evident from the
eligibility requirements and program advertisements that the target audience is quite
specific: upper-class, somehow less-guilty individuals from privileged social groups, who
should be spared the destructive experience of incarceration. Pay-to-stay programs allow
inmates to fulfill their punishment while maintaining employment, familial relationships,

51

and other positive ties to the community (Walters & Davis, 2007)—sparing these inmates
the devastating effects of civil and social death that most U.S. inmates are subjected to.
Pay-to-stay jail programs are yet another example how the criminal justice system—a
constitutionally required government duty—profits from oppression and segregation.
Part II. The City of Fremont & Alameda County
The 92-square mile city of Fremont is located in Alameda County and is a part of
California’s San Francisco Bay Area (City of Fremont, California, Office of Economic
Development, 2015)—an area known for its progressive thinking, technological
innovations, ingenuity, diversity, and wealth. It is also known as the Silicon Valley, home
to Google, Facebook, Apple, and many other billion-dollar corporations. According to
the Bay Area Census, over 7 million people resided in San Francisco and its surrounding
cities in 2010 (Bay Area Census, 2010). Currently, over 1 million people reside in
Alameda County (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli & Evans, 2012, Appendix A, p. 7), which
consists of the following 14 incorporated cities: Alameda, Albany, Berkeley, Dublin,
Emeryville, Fremont, Hayward, Livermore, Newark, Oakland, Piedmont, Pleasanton, San
Leandro, and Union City (County of Alameda, California, 2015).
In 2013, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 13.8% of San Francisco County
residents and 13.0% of Alameda County residents were living in poverty—slightly less
than the 15% national poverty percentage (U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2013). Santa Clara County neighbors Alameda County, and is known to have
the largest “unsheltered homeless” population among big cities in the United States (Lin
II & Holland, 2014, para. 3). In 2014, the largest homeless encampment in the United
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States, known as The Jungle, was destroyed in Santa Clara County, less than 20 miles
outside of Fremont. The destruction of the 68-acre encampment left nearly 300 homeless
individuals without a safe place to sleep (Blake, 2014). Blake (2014) stated, “more than
7,500 homeless people sleep on the streets in Santa Clara County on a given night, in one
of the most socially polarized areas of the world” (para. 9). The Bay Area is infamous for
having one of the world’s largest income gaps.
In 2013, the median household income in the United States was $52,250;
Alameda County’s median household income was $72,128, San Francisco County’s was
$76,933, and Santa Clara’s was $91,843 (U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2013). The city of Fremont’s 2015 community profile reported an average
household income of $114,684, with Tesla and Lam Research Corporation featuring as
two of the top ten employers (City of Fremont, California, Office of Economic
Development, 2015, p. 1). Fremont is the fourth largest city in the Bay and ranks 15th in
California with a total population of 217,700 (City of Fremont, California, Office of
Economic Development, 2015, p. 1). Fremont’s racial demographics differ significantly
both from the demographics of the state of California and from the overall U.S.
population: 50% of residents are Asian, 33% are white, 14% are Hispanic, and 3% are
African American (City of Fremont, California, Office of Economic Development, 2015,
p. 1). Fremont has been ranked number one in the U.S. for technology start-up businesses
per capita, voted second most inventive city in America, and an impressive 49% of its
adult residents hold Bachelors, Graduate, or Professional degrees (City of Fremont,
California, Office of Economic Development, 2015, p. 2).
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The crime rate in Alameda County is roughly 2,840 per 100,000, ranking as the
fourth highest rate out of all 58 counties in California. Fremont’s 2013-2014 year-end
update reported an annual revenue of $150.7 million—generated from property taxes,
sales tax, business taxes, franchise fees, and hotel taxes, to name a few—of which $89.5
million was spent on police and fire public protection departments (City of Fremont,
California, 2014). The 2015-2016 proposed budget for Alameda County reported a total
budget of $2.7 billion, with 23.6% (more than $638 million) being appropriated to public
protection programs—listed as the District Attorney, probation department, Public
Defender, Sheriff’s office, trial court funding, and the fire department (Alameda County
Budget, 2015). Based on these data, both Alameda County and the city of Fremont
allocate a significant amount of their budgets toward public protection each year.
Alameda County is one of the counties that the ACLU refers to as “The Big 25”
(ACLU, 2012, p.12). The Big 25 refers to the 25 counties in California that received the
most realignment funding—roughly $327 million, which amounted to 92% of total state
allocations (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli & Evans, 2012, p.16). In the 2013-2014 fiscal
year, the Alameda County Sheriff’s office spent over $20 million on realignment (Levin,
2015, para. 20).
Fremont is located in a unique area of the United States, surrounded by wealth
and inequality. It is positioned near the Silicon Valley, Berkeley, and San Francisco—
places known for modernization, liberalism, and a progressive ethos. However, Fremont
also neighbors the city of Oakland, which is known for having the highest rate of violent
crime in California (Brock & Kiriakos, 2014) and has particular areas that are “plagued
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by chronically high levels of poverty, unemployment, homelessness, drug addiction, and
street crime” (De Giorgi, 2014, para. 1). Therefore, the unique demographics of Fremont,
as well as its peculiar position in the socioeconomic landscape of the region, make its
new pay-to-stay jail program an interesting case study in the field of punishment and the
changing economy of the prison.
Part III. Fremont Facility & Development of Pay-to-Stay Initiative
The $10.6 million (Watson, 2013) Fremont Detention Facility was built in 2002
as a Type I jail (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012). A Type I jail
is described as:
A local detention facility used for the detention of persons for not more than 96
hours excluding holidays after booking […] [and] may also detain persons on
court order either for their own safekeeping or sentenced to a city jail as an inmate
worker, and may house inmate workers sentenced to the county jail provided such
placement in the facility is made on a voluntary basis on the part of the inmate.
(Sutter County Sheriff, 2015)
According to the Fremont Police website, the jail has a maximum capacity of 96 inmates,
and is the temporary staging area for persons arrested by the Fremont Police Department,
who are awaiting arraignment or transfer to Santa Rita—Alameda County’s jail (Fremont
Police Department, “Detention Facility”). The Fremont Detention Facility currently
books and houses prisoners for the BART Police Department, California Highway Patrol,
Newark Police Department, Union City Police Department, Department of Corrections’
parolees, East Bay Regional Park District Police Department, and U.S. Immigration and
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Customs Enforcement (Fremont Police Department, “Detention Facility”). With 54 beds
and five pods, it is the largest Type-1 jail in Northern California. Yet, the facility has
never operated at full capacity, and typically houses no more than 30 inmates at any
given time (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012).
Due to the recent financial hardships experienced by many California cities,
Fremont underwent a sustainability study in 2011 (Burton, 2013). Management Partners
Incorporated (MPI) conducted a third-party analysis of Fremont’s financial sustainability.
The report was delivered to the City Manager of Fremont, Fred Diaz, in July 2011. The
sustainability study evaluated city services and explored new areas for revenue (Burton,
2013). In the report, MPI noted that Fremont had been affected by the 2008 economic
recession, but that it was “in better shape than most other cities thanks to good financial
management practices” (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, para. 2). However,
Fremont was still incurring more costs than its revenues could cover. MPI estimated a
deficit of $8 million for the fiscal year of 2011-2012. Therefore, MPI suggested that
Fremont make changes to its service delivery model, reduce compensations, control
expenditures, and increase revenue. A list of 33 money-saving and revenue-generating
recommendations was presented to the City Manager. Recommendations included
outsourcing landscaping maintenance, consolidating police dispatch with Newark and
Union City, implementing a new rotating police patrol schedule, increasing taxes,
increasing clean water fees, and developing a pay-to-stay program for the Fremont
Detention Center (see Appendix A for complete list). The pay-to-stay recommendation
explained the program as an “offering” for misdemeanants “to pay a fee to opt out of the
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County jail facility (Santa Rita) and serve time in what could be considered a safer, less
intimidating, facility” (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, p. 90). MPI also noted
the upcoming effects of California’s AB 109, Public Safety Realignment legislation:
“[c]ourt orders requiring the State of California to reduce crowding in prisons will likely
exacerbate crowding at the county level […] making an alternative like the Fremont
Detention Center more attractive” (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, p. 90). The
study estimated the pay-to-stay program to generate an annual revenue between $250,000
and $300,000 (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, p. 90). The Fremont
Sustainability Study Action Plan was adopted by the City Council on October 4, 2011—
three days after AB 109 was implemented (Fremont City Council, City Manager’s Office,
2011). Fremont City Council chose to implement 15 of the proposed 33
recommendations, including creating a pay-to-stay program run by the city police
department (Fremont City Council, City Manager’s Office, 2011).
Lt. Mark Devine of the Fremont Police Department proposed a resolution to
Fremont City Council to implement a pay-to-stay jail program that would utilize the
unused beds at the Fremont Detention Facility to produce revenue (City of Fremont,
California, Fremont City Council, 2012). The resolution was titled “Alternative
Confinement Program” and referred to inmates solely as “participants”. The resolution
framed pay-to-stay inmates as less guilty, willing participants and otherwise respectable
citizens that simply made a mistake, compared to the socially damaged, dangerous, and
violent inmates detained at Santa Rita jail. The resolution amended the Master Fee
Schedule for the Fremont Detention Facility, allowing the Fremont Police Department to
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charge inmates $155 a night with a one-time $45 administrative fee. The mayor of
Fremont, the city clerk, and the assistant city attorney signed the resolution on March
20th, 2012 (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012; Fremont City
Council, City Manager’s Office, 2011). The Alternative Confinement Program report
identified the pay-to-stay program as a service to the “participant” and a solution to
county jail “problems”.
The Alternative Confinement Program report employs a narrative of the
inexperienced minor offender who deserves a higher level of safety and security than the
typical county jail inmate. The report names three components that are necessary for the
success of the pay-to-stay program: the Courts, the “Participant”, and the City of
Fremont. The interests for each component are outlined as follows: (1) The Courts expect
that all sentences will be fully served, participants will receive no special comforts, and
participants will be treated equally regardless of community status or fame (City of
Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012). Ironically, being approved for pay-tostay eligibility is in itself a special treatment and a reflection of inequality based on
status. (2) The interests of the Participant are listed as: personal security, cost, and
convenience. The report explains the convenience of incarceration at the Fremont facility:
“the Fremont Detention Facility is near two major freeways and within walking distance
of BART [and] there is adequate free parking across [the street]” (City of Fremont,
California, Fremont City Council, 2012, “Convenience”). The inclusion of free parking
instructions and ease of highway access downplays the fact that the pay-to-stay program
is handling the incarceration and punishment of convicted offenders. (3) The interests of
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the City are illustrated as follows: participant safety, management of participants,
management of staff assets, and revenue objective. Management of participants describes
eligibility requirements such as no felony convictions, no convictions for sex crimes, no
drug convictions, no major health issues, no gang affiliation, and that the participant
cannot serve more than four consecutive days at a time. The Revenue Objective section
explains that other counties in Southern California have successfully implemented payto-stay programs charging inmates anywhere from $85 to $255 per night, and that the
Fremont program would start with a mid-range rate of $155 per night (City of Fremont,
California, Fremont City Council, 2012).
The report also examines the fiscal impact of the pay-to-stay program. It
calculates that if one pod with 16 beds were to be filled each weekend, there would be
over 1600 stays per year. A conservative estimate using a 50% participation rate was
generated and estimated a profit of nearly $125,000 per year. The application fee would
generate another estimated $18,000 per year (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City
Council, 2012). At full capacity, the pay-to-stay jail could turn an estimated net profit of
$244,000 per year (“Fremont Police”, 2013).
To review, the city of Fremont was affected by the 2008 economic recession,
opening the door for financial review. In 2011, a third-party auditor strategically analyzed
the city budget and made several recommendations that would help Fremont decrease its
deficit. The pay-to-stay recommendation was suggested as a way to generate revenue
within the correctional system and coincided with the upcoming implementation of AB
109, California’s prison realignment. The city of Fremont was quick to develop and pass
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the pay-to-stay proposal and seamlessly implemented the program with little to no
political resistance. The Fremont pay-to-stay jail program has been in effect since March
2012.
Part IV. Getting in: Eligibility & the Application Process
Unlike county jail, there is no general admittance to the Fremont pay-to-stay
facility. Lt. Tom Mikkelsen, an operator of the Fremont pay-to-stay jail, states, “the
program does not accept all applicants […] inmates with gang affiliations or a history of
violence or sex crimes will be sent to one of the county jails” (De Benedetti, 2013). Lt.
Mark Devine, creator of the pay-to-stay proposal, claimed “this place is for a person who
has committed a petty theft or a DUI […] it’s for people who need to serve one or five, or
maybe 10 days in jail” (De Benedetti, 2013). Local jail administrators seem to be on the
same page regarding who pay-to-stay is designed for, which is significant considering
that the eligibility requirements are not well-defined. In my personal correspondence with
the manager of the Fremont Detention Facility, he also explained that the pay-to-stay
program was meant for misdemeanor offenders who are currently working, “providing
for their families”, would like to serve time on their days off, and who want the “safety
and peace of mind” that can be provided with the upgrade (personal communication, May
12, 2015).
Section 915.2 of the Fremont Police Department’s Policy Manual lists the
qualifications for inmates to participate in the pay-to-stay program (see Appendix B for
the entire pay-to-stay policy). The qualifications for pay-to-stay admittance are as
follows:
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(a) Participants must have submitted all documentation and required forms at least
10 days before the “desired incarceration start date” (Fremont Police
Department, Policy Manual, 2013, para. 2)
(b) “Participants will be prescreened for suitability and to confirm that all of the
established conditions of the program are met.” (Fremont Police Department,
Policy Manual, 2013, para. 3)
(c) The participant will be required to pay the application fee of $45 and the daily
fee of $155
(d) Standard booking requirements must be met
(e) Participants are expected to arrive on time for detention and stay for their full
commitment time
(f) Participants must bring an approved form of identification
(g) Participants may only bring approved items in to the Detention Facility
(h) Participants with specific medical conditions cannot be accepted as there is no
on-site medical staff (Fremont Police Department, Policy Manual, 2013).
The listed qualifications are vague and allow for discretional interpretation. Condition (b)
is a primary example of how the policy is written in such a way as to allow for police
discretion to determine acceptance, even if the rest of the requirements have been
satisfied. The documentation and required forms listed in condition (a) also help screen
out unwanted applicants.
The application forms clearly dictate who is and, more importantly, who is not
eligible for admittance. The application process has various stages. First, the offender
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must be referred to the pay-to-stay facility by a sentencing judge with what is called a
Court Commitment Order (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to Stay”). It is unclear
whether this decision is based on financial ability to pay the nightly fee or if it is left
solely to the discretion of the judge. The offender must then fill out and submit a pay-tostay program application (see Appendix C), which includes general personal information
as well as a medical information questionnaire. The medical questionnaire asks applicants
to list any medical problems, contact information for their physician, any prescribed
medications, and medical insurance information.
The application is then reviewed and the applicant is either rejected or
conditionally accepted to the program—pending the results of their prescreening. If
accepted, the applicant must fill out the remaining documents, provide a copy of his or
her negative Tuberculosis (TB) test, and pay the $45 application fee (Fremont Police
Department, “Pay to Stay”). The offender must then review and sign the conditions for
participation (see Appendix D). These conditions include payment of $155 per day (in
cash, cashier’s check, or money order), a Court Commitment Order detailing how much
time may be served at the facility, a State or US Federal government-issued passport or
picture identification card, parking instructions, and a list of articles participants may
bring with them (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to Stay”). Lastly, the offender must
sign an agreement to follow the rules and conditions of confinement in the pay-to-stay
facility (see Appendix E). The document contains 18 rules to abide by, mostly pertaining
to cleanliness, good behavior, and prohibited paraphernalia. Visitation privileges and
length of stay are also outlined (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to Stay”). Upon
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submission and approval of all documents, the participant may check in to the pay-to-stay
jail. The participant serves a portion, or all, of his or her sentence in the designated payto-stay pod, separated from the rest of the county jail population (Fremont Police
Department, “Pay to Stay”).
The entire process is similar to that of a college application: recommendations are
required, general personal information is recorded, past performance is evaluated, and
applicants are conditionally accepted pending payment and submission of the remaining
documents. The detailed, formal application process inherently selects applicants based
on the sophistication, educational level, and social status of the person applying. Not only
is the ‘application pool’ limited to those who can afford it, but also to those who receive
Court Commitment Orders and can successfully navigate through the application process.
In a local ABC news clip, Lt. Mark Devine explained, “It isn't a hotel necessarily.
You aren't going to find a warm cookie on your bed. But it gives you an alternative place
to serve your time if you need serve time for being sentenced to a misdemeanor”
(Kiriyama, 2013, para. 7). He added, “as far as being an unequal treatment or jail only for
the rich, I think it's important to remember that there is a cost to providing government
services and that cost where appropriate should be born by the people utilizing the facility
or the program” (Kiriyama, 2013, para. 14). It is evident that the pay-to-stay option is
only available to the wealthy and social elite. The Fremont pay-to-stay program is the
first in the Bay Area, and almost certainly not the last.
Chapter IV. Analysis, Discussion, and Conclusion
According to Irwin (1985), the detrimental effects of incarceration are substantial:
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When persons are arrested and jailed, they suffer more than the obvious forms of
discomfort and deprivation: sudden interruption of their affairs; instant and total loss
of mobility; abrupt initiation into the jail; a subsequent restriction of activities to a
very small area; virtual absence of all opportunities for recreation and expression;
unavoidable and constant close contact with strangers, many of whom are threatening
or repulsive; and a reduced health regimen that can lead to physical deterioration and
occasionally to serious illness. (p. 45-46)
For a price, the pay-to-stay program offers an escape from the unwanted experience of
incarceration. Through vague eligibility requirements, screening processes, and
application hurdles, the pay-to-stay program determines who is worthy of safety,
humility, and justice. A proponent of mass incarceration, pay-to-stay is a race- and classbased system of confinement. It allows the upper, and predominantly white, class to
sidestep any exposure to lower-class inmates in county jails by offering better protection
at a higher cost. As Buchanan (2007) simply stated, pay-to-stay is not available to
everyone. It is not even available to everyone who can afford it. “Admission is invariably
subject to screening interviews, for which there are no acknowledged criteria,” he claims,
“pay-to-stay eligibility is thus in some inchoate way contingent on who the inmate is, not
on what he (or, less often, she) has done” (Buchanan, 2007, p. 63).
Pay-to-stay jails reproduce class and racial segregation under the guise of
equality. Although pay-to-stay legislation may be written in race-neutral or class-neutral
language, the bottom line is that only certain races and classes are realistically eligible for
the pay-to-stay program. It dictates who is deserving and who is undeserving of
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government protection and safety. Although people of many races, genders, and
socioeconomic backgrounds may commit non-violent misdemeanors, such as driving
under the influence (DUI), the undeserving can now be weeded out to county jails while
the deserving are offered a safer space. Irwin explained, “when a given act is performed
by a disreputable—a person who is deemed worthless or of low character—it is not
considered the same as when it is performed by an ordinary citizen” (Irwin, 1985, p. 23).
In other words, not everyone is equally guilty in the U.S. criminal justice system; some
offenders are elevated to a higher status of innocence while others are carried to the
prison gates. The oppressive nature of the prison system and its unequal treatment of
offenders implies that “our society is not only maintaining its conventional class divisions
but is also widening the gap between conventional society and a large underclass” (Irwin,
1985, p. 104)
Scholars have argued that the criminal justice system is an inherently oppressive
institution from the bottom up (Davis, 2003; Alexander, 2010; Epp, Maynard-Moody, &
Haider-Markel, 2014). In nearly 45 years, public sentiment toward crime has not wavered
from the classic “us versus them” mentality. It does not question the flaws of the
institution, but rather continues to blame individual choice. Pay-to-stay is justified
through this rhetoric of personal responsibility and free choice. The United States has an
extensive history of blaming the offender and then exploiting him or her for economic
gain. Pay-to-stay emulates the neoliberal philosophy that economic power and social
prestige can separate the dominant class from the experiences of the underclass. To quote
Carl Takei of the ACLU National Prison Project (as quoted in De Benedetti, 2013),
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“there should not be one form of punishment for those who can afford to pay and a
different form of punishment for those who can’t […] it’s a matter of equality” (para. 17).
Pay-to-stay paves a slippery slope for race- and class-based discrimination in the justice
system. The government is required to protect all offenders equally, regardless of race,
socio-economic status, religion, or sexual preference. Ability to pay should not determine
a citizen’s level of freedom to and freedom from government protection. “Capitalism and
correctional systems don’t mix well,” claim Levenson and Gordon (2007), “[…]
resistance to pay-to-stay essentially boils down to a wariness of allowing the government
to shirk one of its primary obligations” (p. 70).
The pay-to-stay program is not the core problem; rather, it is the racially framed
institution that supports its existence. The mere existence of pay-to-stay jails is an
acknowledgement by the state that prisons and jails are overcrowded, abusive, and
racialized systems. Yet, the most recent solution has been to create a two-tiered jail
system in which incarceration depends on status. As long as pay-to-stay jails are seen as a
solution to the problem, the penal system of oppression and segregation will continue.
The introduction of pay-to-stay programs has shed more light on racial and class
inequalities in the U.S. penal system. Regardless of intention, whether to balance local
budgets or decrease overcrowding, the pay-to-stay program reproduces an oppressive
institution whereby offenders are separated in to categories of deservedness and privilege.
Pay-to-stay programs allow privileged populations to “pay” for their crime while
avoiding the dehumanizing, demoralizing, and socially damaging experience of
confinement in overcrowded county jails. In other words, pay-to-stay programs dictate
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who is and, more importantly, who is not exempt from the consequences of mass
incarceration and the growing prison economy.
Concluding Thoughts & Suggestions for Future Research
The significant lack of empirical data on pay-to-stay programs is undeniable.
Such penal initiatives should be of growing concern to the public, as the U.S. criminal
justice system shifts further in to the political spotlight. The U.S. penal system is nearing
its financial breaking point, demanding attention and change from those in power. The
prison crisis, driven by budgetary concern, is now commanding attention from
presidential prospects and other U.S. leaders. It is important to study reform initiatives
like pay-to-stay as penal debates are gaining momentum in the political arena. To the
degree that cost-cutting measures and budgetary restraints have influenced current
debates, there is a fear that the solution will be to shift even more of the costs on to
inmates.
The recent “smart on crime” and “right on crime” penal reform movements
acknowledge that mass incarceration must come to an end, and push for smarter and
cheaper incarceration alternatives. “Smart” and “right” on crime movements are able to
address issues within the justice system without appearing lenient toward prisoners
(Aviram, 2015). In Aviram’s Cheap on Crime (2015), she argues “the advent of the
financial crisis has given rise to a prominent new discourse of cost, frugality, and
prudence, which has permeated our political and public conversations about corrections
and has become a powerful rhetoric and motivator in political campaigns and
administrative negotiations” (p. 5). However, cost-saving measures may not always
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translate to decarceration. As California has witnessed with the implementation of AB
109, the legislation simply shifted the fiscal responsibility of prisoners to the county
level. This inmate displacement may have slightly reduced state and federal prison
populations, but it placed a burden on city and county level facilities. Counties that are
still recovering from the 2008 economic crisis are left with the responsibility of housing
more inmates while dealing with the associate increase in cost. Pay-to-stay programs,
therefore, may become a viable option in the minds of jail administrators and community
members. The program addresses prison overcrowding and the fiscal crisis without
disrupting the race and class constructs of greater society. Pay-to-stay programs also
align with the “smart on crime” and “right on crime” initiatives while still providing a
punishment for criminals—however lax that punishment may be. There is a looming risk
that inmate-financed programs such as pay-to-stay, will become acceptable solutions to
the prison crisis.
Mass incarceration has been rarely discussed in the political arena, however,
penal reform has recently become a major topic in the 2016 Presidential debates. The
corrections system has been under fire recently due to its steep costs, immense
overcrowding, and the increasing momentum of Black Lives Matter—an activist
movement that protests against racial profiling by police and the overrepresentation of
African Americans in the criminal justice system. The movement, which began in 2013
with the murder of Trayvon Martin, has helped bring justice and racial inequality in to the
spotlight. Protests have taken place around the country, even interrupting presidential
campaign speeches, and have placed great scrutiny on police officers and correctional
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institutions. The U.S. justice system is closer than it has been in the past four decades to a
pivotal moment of change. The direction of change, however, is still unknown.
Future research should focus on the fairness and equality of money-making
correctional programs, such as the pay-to-stay initiative, prison room and board fees, and
the broader prison industrial complex. Due to the lack of studies surrounding pay-to-stay
programs, any future research would add important knowledge to the field of
criminology. An in-depth, quantitative analysis of the pay-to-stay phenomenon would
help provide necessary data, such as inmate demographics, costs of the program, and
public opinion polls. Qualitative or ethnographic studies would help analyze important
information that may be missing from the research, such as the pay-to-stay inmate
experience, opinions of jail administrators and correctional staff, and the experience of
inmates who were ineligible for the program. Studies should, even more importantly,
focus on prison alternatives, reform, decarceration, and abolition, as these are the only
ways to undo the damage and begin addressing the inequalities produced by mass
incarceration in the United States.
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APPENDIX F: Fremont City Council Pay-to-Stay Draft Resolution

DRAFT
RESOLUTION NO. 2012-XX
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
FREMONT UPDATING THE MASTER FEE SCHEDULE FOR
THE FREMONT DETENTION FACILITY ALTERNATIVE
CONFINEMENT (“PAY-TO-STAY”) PROGRAM
WHEREAS, the City has established fees for specific services provided by the Police
Department which are reflected in the City’s Master Fee Schedule; and
WHEREAS, the fees established for these services are intended to cover but not exceed
the City’s costs of providing the services; and
WHEREAS, the Police Department has reviewed the administrative processing fee
charged for application to the alternative confinement program, and has calculated the fee using
the current wage-billing schedule for labor costs; and
WHEREAS, in addition to fees for specific services, the City’s Master Fee Schedule also
reflects current rates for proprietary services offered by the City, such as facilities rental, etc.;
and
WHEREAS, separate from the administrative processing fee, the Police Department
Detention Facility staff have proposed a daily rate of $155 be charged to each person who elects
to participate in the alternative confinement program.
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the information set forth in the report to the City Council
dated March 20, 2012, as well as any information submitted to the City Council during the public
hearing, or considered by the City Council during its deliberations on this matter,
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF FREMONT HEREBY RESOLVES AS
FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. The Master Fee Schedule (Resolution No. No. 8672, as amended) is hereby further
amended by revising Article VII, Section A, to add a new Subsection 18 to read as follows:
001.
2162.3335
2162.3336

18. Alternative Confinement (“Pay-to-Stay”) Program
a. Application Processing Fee
$ 45.00
b. Daily rental charge
$155.00

SECTION 2. This resolution shall be effective ___________, 2012
***
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